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Abstract Fiscal rules are mentioned as instruments to commit political actors on
long-term fiscal sustainability. However, fiscal rules may have stronger effects on
projected than on realized fiscal outcomes because of window-dressing measures or
because they alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In our analysis for
Swiss cantons, fiscal rules significantly lower the probability of projected and re-
alized deficits with the former effect being twice as large. Projections are generally
over-pessimistic but fiscal rules increase the probability of accurate projections. Thus,
fiscal rules seem to substitute for finance ministers’ over-pessimistic projections in-
tended to reign in fellow ministers and legislatures (100 words).
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1 Introduction
Fiscal rules have become an important institutional requirement for many countries
in balancing their budgets. While until the early 1990s, only few countries used fiscal
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rules in their budget procedures, a comprehensive survey by the IMF (2009) counts
more than 80 countries having enacted balanced-budget requirements in some way
on the federal or sub-federal level. Most recently, on 2 March 2012, most members
of the Eurozone agreed on a European Fiscal Compact. The compact requires treaty-
countries to balance their budgets on a maximum annual structural deficit of 0.5 %
of GDP—1 % structural deficit in case of debt levels significantly below 60 % of
GDP. Very much the same applies for the nation-level. Germany has approved the
Schuldenbremse on all levels of government as an institutional provision for sus-
tainable public finances (Feld 2010). The German Schuldenbremse has been inspired
much by the Swiss experience on this specific fiscal rule, which dates back to 2003
(Danninger 2002). In France and other countries, fiscal rules are now proposed by the
government to signal their commitment for efforts in consolidating public finances
(IMF Article IV consultations, 2011).
A predominant explanation for the need of balanced budget requirements focuses
on the common pool characteristics of the public budget, which tends to be overused
by special interest groups that try to target public spending on specific claims while
spreading the costs by general taxes over the whole taxpaying population (Weingast
et al. 1981; Velasco 2000; van der Ploeg 2010; various articles in Poterba and von
Hagen 1999). Overall, there is ample evidence on the effectiveness of fiscal rules
in restraining budget deficits and government indebtedness for many countries (De-
brun et al. 2009). Guichard et al. (2007) also provide empirical evidence for OECD
countries that fiscal rules support fiscal adjustments, especially in cases of large con-
solidations.
However, fiscal rules have also been subject to criticism due to their incentives for
“creative accounting” and “window-dressing” measures including overly optimistic
fiscal projections. For example, von Hagen (2010) argues that budget institutions like
fiscal rules are an important determinant of budgeting errors. Intuitively, fiscal rules
may have two different effects on the quality of budget forecasts: On the one hand,
fiscal rules could create incentives to be overly optimistic in budget projections in
order to postpone politically disputed budget cuts or tax increases. On the other hand,
without fiscal rules, finance ministers may strategically use over-pessimistic budget
forecasts to rein in the spending ministers and the legislatures. Fiscal rules lower
these incentives. In both cases, fiscal rules reduce the probability of projected budget
deficits by more than they reduce the probability of realized ones. However, while in
the former case budget projections become less reliable, they become more accurate
in the latter case.
Our empirical analysis for Swiss cantons over the 1984 to 2005 period finds evi-
dence consistent with these expectations. Fiscal rules reduce the probability of pro-
jecting and realizing a budget deficit. However, the former effect is roughly twice as
large as the latter. Since budget projections in Swiss cantons are on average overly
pessimistic, we take this as evidence that fiscal rules substitute strategic projections
in budget negotiations between the finance minister and fellow cabinet members or
legislatures. We find similar results with different estimation techniques, estimators
of variance, different codings of the fiscal rule variable, additional institutional and
political variables as well as when excluding individual cantons.
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the
literature on the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal outcomes (Poterba 1994; Rueben
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1995; Bohn and Inman 1996; Feld and Kirchgässner 2001; Schaltegger 2002;
Debrun et al. 2008) as well as on window-dressing measures (von Hagen 1991;
Milesi-Ferretti 2003; Koen and van den Noord 2005; Von Hagen and Wolff 2006;
Buti et al. 2007). Second, the paper contributes to the literature on forecasting errors
in fiscal projections (Heinemann 2006; Wallack 2007; Boylan 2008; Goeminne et
al. 2008; Bischoff and Gohout 2010; von Hagen 2010; Frankel 2011; Chatagny and
Soguel 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we discuss poten-
tial effects of fiscal rules on budget deficits, both projected and realized. Section 3
presents the empirical strategy and the data, Sect. 4 the results. Concluding remarks
are provided in Sect. 5.
2 Background
Fiscal rules aim at constraining governments’ ability to run deficits and accumu-
late debt. However, fiscal rules not only create incentives for fiscal adjustments, they
also create incentives to avoid the constraints imposed by these rules through vari-
ous forms of window-dressing measures. Further, the introduction of fiscal rules can
also alter the bargaining situation in the budget process. In particular, fiscal rules may
reduce the incentives of finance ministers to strategically understate projections of
fiscal outcomes in negotiations with spending ministers or the legislatures.
Economists have long recognized the incentives created by fiscal rules for the use
of creative accounting and strategic use of fiscal projections. Milesi-Ferretti (2003)
studies the optimal design and effectiveness of fiscal rules in the presence of creative
accounting. He finds that the scope for creative accounting makes tighter fiscal rules
desirable. Several empirical studies for the US states and European countries doc-
ument evidence of fiscal gimmickry induced by fiscal rules. In an analysis of fiscal
performance across the US states, von Hagen (1991) finds that debt ceilings lead gov-
ernments to substitute nonrestricted debt instruments for restricted ones. Von Hagen
and Wolff (2006) and Buti et al. (2007) show that the Stability and Growth Pact in the
European Union increased the propensity of governments to shift budget deficits to
off-budget deficits in form of stock-flow adjustments. In the same vein, Koen and van
den Noord (2005) find publicly known instances of fiscal gimmickry in the European
Union to become more likely with binding fiscal rules.
With such window-dressing measures, governments meet the letter but not the
spirit of fiscal rules. Nevertheless, the fiscal variables targeted by the rules do im-
prove. This need not be the case if governments strategically use fiscal projections in
the budgetary process. In particular, governments may use overly optimistic projec-
tions in order to buy time and meet rules requiring governments to submit or legisla-
tures to pass a balanced budget. Indeed, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that in the ret-
rospective, end-of-the-year requirements but not prospective, beginning-of-the-year
requirements have a positive effect on the surplus of general funds in US states.
Fiscal rules may also alter the bargaining situation between the finance minister
and spending ministers or between the government and the legislature in the budget
process. Spending ministers and legislatures benefit from specific policies targeted
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at their constituencies, but they bear only part of the marginal costs since the costs
are financed by taxpayers in general. This common pool characteristic of the bud-
get leads spending ministers and legislatures to overspend. A fragmented govern-
ment also leads to a dynamic common pool problem with too much spending and
too little taxation in the present, and thus accumulation of deficits (Velasco 2000;
van der Ploeg 2010). Besides the prime ministers, only finance ministers without
portfolio and responsible for the full budget internalize the full costs (von Hagen and
Harden 1995). Further, prudence and caution is important for finance ministers’ rep-
utation (van der Ploeg 2010). Finance ministers may thus strategically use fiscal pro-
jections to rein in spending ministers and legislatures. In particular, finance ministers
have an incentive to produce overly pessimistic forecasts so as to discourage exces-
sive spending bids by cabinet members and legislatures. This, however, can lead to
suspicion among fellow cabinet members and legislatures regarding finance minis-
ters’ deficit projections. Indeed, there is often widespread suspicion among cantonal
legislatures that projections are systematically erring on the side of pessimism (see
Schaltegger and Weder 2010 for a recent example for the canton of Zurich). Antici-
pated projection biases can therefore become part of the equilibrium of negotiations
(von Hagen 2010).
Fiscal rules that require the government to submit and the legislature to pass a
balanced budget substantially alter the bargaining situation between the finance min-
isters and the cabinet as well as between the finance minister and the legislature. On
the one hand, it becomes more costly for finance ministers to submit a budget deficit
for strategic reasons. On the other hand, binding fiscal rules also reduce the need for
strategic behavior in the budget process. Finance ministers can invoke the fiscal rule
to rein in spending ministers and legislatures. In this sense, fiscal rules serve as a
substitute for strategic projections.1
To summarize, we expect that fiscal rules have the intended effect on the fiscal
aggregate targeted by the rules. However, the reasoning above suggests that we should
expect different effects on projected than on realized deficits. Specifically, we expect
a stronger effect on projected than on realized deficits. The difference can reflect time-
buying and window-dressing measures or reduced incentives of finance ministers to
strategically submit overly pessimistic budgets.
3 Empirical strategy and data
We test the theoretical expectations with data for Swiss cantons in the years 1984
to 2005. Swiss cantons provide an ideal testing ground for three reasons. First, there
was a staggered introduction of fiscal rules in half of the cantons until 2005. We
can, thus, identify the effect of fiscal rules on our outcomes of interest by controlling
for all time-invariant canton-specific as well as nationwide time-specific confounders.
Second, Swiss cantons have a high degree of fiscal autonomy. In Switzerland, cantons
1According to von Hagen (2010) stringent fiscal rules may increase incentives for using projections strate-
gically. This is the case if negotiations over additional budget cuts are particularly costly and if such re-
negotiations become less avoidable with more stringent fiscal rules.
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are directly responsible for around 40 % of all public revenues and expenditures.
Third, in spite of institutional variation and fiscal autonomy, Swiss cantons share a
broadly common constitutional, political, and cultural environment. Thus, there is
less heterogeneity across cantons than across countries, making spurious correlations
caused by omitted variables less likely.
Our two main dependent variables are binary variables for whether or not a deficit
has been projected or realized. This is arguably the margin most directly affected by
fiscal rules. Fiscal rules are not binding in case of a budget surplus, which is the rule
in our sample. Hence, fiscal rules do not affect the size of a budget surplus. Some of
the consequences stipulated by fiscal rules may increase with the size of the deficit.
This is, for example, the case if fiscal rules require deficits to be repaid with funds
included in next year’s budget. Other consequences, such as the postponement of tax
cuts, are independent of the size of the deficit. Further, the political costs for violating
fiscal rules are also likely to depend more on the occurrence of a deficit, than on its
size. The same approach has been used previously by Bohn and Inman (1996).
Harmonized data on deficits and deficit projections are obtained by the conference
of cantonal finance ministers (Konferenz der kantonalen Finanzdirektorinnen und Fi-
nanzdirektoren, FDK for short); the data are available since 1984.2 In Swiss cantons,
the government prepares the budget proposal for the parliament as a so called Vo-
ranschlag. Based on this input, the parliament decides on budget projections, the so
called Budget. Our variable on deficit projections refers to budgets passed by the leg-
islature, i.e., the Budget. Both, proposal and projections are subject to fiscal rules, if
existing.
Our explanatory variable of interest is the fiscal rule variable. While at the federal
level, the Schuldenbremse exists since 2003, the situation at the cantonal level is
much more diverse. In St. Gallen (SG), a fiscal rule was introduced in 1929 already.
In Fribourg (FR), the fiscal rule dates back to 1960. More recently, Solothurn (SO)
(1986), Grisons (GR) (1988), and Appenzell a. Rh. (AR) (1996) followed the early
examples. Jura (JU) (2001), Lucerne (LU) (2001), Zurich (ZH) (2001), Berne (BE)
(2002), Schwyz (SZ) (2004), Aargau (AG) (2005), Neuchatel (NE) (2005), and Valais
(VS) (2005) have introduced their fiscal rules on the basis of the Schuldenbremse at
the federal level.
A detailed description of the legal provisions for the cantonal fiscal rules can be
found in Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) and Feld et al. (2011a, 2011b).3 The legal
requirements of these rules differ largely along several dimensions: budget coverage
of the rule, escape clauses, sanction mechanisms or constitutional implementation
(see Table 4 in the Appendix). According to Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) and Feld et
al. (2011a, 2011b), the stringency of fiscal rules in Swiss cantons can be distinguished
into three groups. St. Gallen (SG) and Fribourg (FR) are most restrictive, especially
because the rules force the government to increase taxes or to compensate budget
deficits in the following budgets as a sanction in case the requirements are not met.
The second most stringent rules apply for Aargau (AG), Berne (BE), Lucerne (LU),
2Data since 1999 are online available under http://www.fdk-cdf.ch/index/finanzdaten.htm; for earlier years
we obtained copies of the data tables from Christian Meyer, finance administration of the canton of Zurich.
3An early version of a fiscal rule index for Swiss cantons can be found in Schaltegger (2002).
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Neuchatel (NE), Solothurn (SO), and Valais (VS). In most cases, fiscal rules do not
entail or have only lose automatic sanctions which make the enforcement of the rule
more difficult. The third group covers the cantons of Appenzell a. Rh (AR), Grisons
(GR), Jura (JU), Schwyz (SZ), and Zurich (ZH). Their rules have several escape
clauses, define a narrow budget coverage with loopholes or do not secure the rule
constitutionally which makes effective enforcement of the rules even more unlikely.
Following this categorization, Feld and Kirchgässner (2008) build a fiscal rule
index, which gives the value of 3 to the first group of cantons with most stringent
rules, 2 to the second group of cantons with moderately stringent rules, 1 to the group
with the least stringent fiscal rules and 0 for all others. Since there is always some
arbitrariness in the construction of a stringency-index, we also use a dummy variable
if a fiscal rule applies as an alternative to the index in our empirical analysis.
It is important to note, that budget rules for Swiss cantons do not relate to structural
deficits. In the cantonal laws, there is not a reference to an output gap, which should
be taken into account. In contrast to fiscal rules at the national level, it is currently
impossible to implement cantonal rules relating to the structural deficit since no data
on the structural budget of cantons exist. However, some cantonal fiscal rules have
implemented escape clauses in the case of a severe recession. Thus, fiscal rules on the
cantonal level apply to the nominal budget but in some cases leave space for times of
severe economic distress.
In our baseline regressions, we control for debt as a share of cantonal income and
voters’ fiscal preferences. The variable for voters’ preferences is an updated and time-
varying version of similar variables constructed by Dafflon and Pujol (2001), Pujol
and Weber (2003), and Funk and Gathmann (2011). The variable captures voters’
fiscal preferences as revealed in federal ballots. This variable has two notable advan-
tages. First, federal ballots on fiscal issues are frequent. Thus, using cantonal approval
rates on these ballots yields a very direct realtime measure of fiscal preferences. Sec-
ond, the ballots provide a simultaneous decision by voters from all cantons on the
exact same issue. The measure is thus directly comparable across cantons. Based on
the approval rates, we build a time-variant continuous variable of fiscal conservatism
of cantonal voters. Following Dafflon and Pujol (2001), we define fiscal conservatism
as a preference for a balanced budget. For a particular ballot, cantons receive higher
values the higher (lower) the acceptance rate of ballots leading to less (more) expen-
ditures is. Similarly, cantons receive higher values the higher (lower) the acceptance
rate of ballots leading to more (less) revenues is.4
4The preference measure is constructed in four steps. First, we select the ballots at the federal level with
strong and unambiguous fiscal consequences. Second, we code the type of the fiscal consequences, i.e.,
whether the ballot results in expenditure increases or decreases, tax increases or decreases, or fiscal ad-
justments. On this basis, we determine whether an individual in favor of a balanced budget would reject or
accept the proposition. Third, the preference index is constructed as the deviation of the cantonal approval
rate from the national approval rate. Following Dafflon and Pujol (2001) and Pujol and Weber (2003),
the votes are normalized so as to give the Swiss mean an approval rate of 50 percent. Finally, the pref-
erence measure is aggregated over individual ballots to the level of cantons and years. For the years up
to 1998, we use the selection and coding of ballots as provided by Dafflon and Pujol (2001) and Pujol
and Weber (2003). For later years, we selected and coded the ballots ourselves by examining the official
documents on the ballots and following the coding rule proposed by Dafflon and Pujol (2001) and Pujol
and Weber (2003). From the 75 ballots held between 1999 and 2005, we identified 24 that have strong
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The sociodemographic and the income situation of the cantons are taken into ac-
count by growth of cantonal income per capita, unemployment growth, the share of
population below the age of 20 and above the age of 64 as well as a variable capturing
the share of the German-speaking population. Data on cantonal income is only avail-
able until 2005, restricting our sample period to the years 1984–2005. Further, many
cantons switched from a system in which taxes are based on previous year’s income
(praenumerando system) to a system in which taxes are based on current year’s in-
come (postnumerando system). In a postnumerando system, tax revenue forecasting
takes place under greater uncertainty. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for
cantons and years with a postnumerando tax system in all our regressions.
In robustness analyses, we include a rich set of further institutional and politi-
cal variables. We include variables for institutional provisions like mandatory fiscal
referenda to control the budget process, the signature requirement to launch a voter
initiative, and the degree of fiscal decentralization between the cantons and their com-
munes. Further, we control for cabinet size and the size of the parliament to proxy the
extent of the common pool problem with the cantonal public budget. As an additional
measure of the ideological position of cantonal politics, we use the share of left-wing
legislatures.
4 Results
Table 2 presents the basic results for the effect of fiscal rules on the probability of pro-
jected and realized deficits. Fiscal rules lower the probability of a projected deficit by
around 28 %, the probability of a realized deficit by around 15 %. Thus, the effect on
projected deficits is nearly twice as large as the effect on realized deficits. Further, the
difference is not only economically large, it is also statistically significant (p-value:
0.005).5 Regressions with forecasted and realized surplus as a share of cantonal in-
come yield broadly similar results with respect to sign and relative size of coefficients,
but not with respect to statistical significance. The effect of fiscal rules on forecasted
surplus is positive (coef.: 0.0010; p-value: 0.232) and 37 % larger than the effect
on realized surplus (coef.: 0.0008; p-value: 0.752).6 However, as we discussed in
Sect. 3, we do not think that the continuous surplus variable is the appropriate depen-
dent variable. Fiscal rules relate to the nominal deficit, not the structural deficit. Thus,
they are not binding in the case of a surplus, which is the rule in our sample. Second,
many consequences such as the postponement of tax cuts and political costs depend
on the occurrence of a deficit rather than on its size. Therefore, the occurrence of a
deficit versus a surplus is the margin most directly affected by fiscal rules.
Among the control variables, only demographics matter: Population growth for
projected and realized deficits and age composition of the population for realized
deficits.
and unambiguous fiscal consequences. The list with the selection and coding of ballots is available upon
request.
5The statistical difference between the coefficients for fiscal rules in columns I and II of Table 2 is esti-
mated using seemingly unrelated regressions. Complete results available upon request from the authors.
6Complete results available upon request from the authors.
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Deficit forecasted 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00
Deficit realized 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
Sign of budget balance correctly forecasted 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Fiscal rule index 0.42 0.91 0.00 3.00
Fiscal rule dummy 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Debt as share of cantonal income 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.88
Voter preferences 49.90 6.46 20.49 72.00
Mandatory fiscal referendum 0.64 0.48 0.00 1.00
Signature requirement initiative, relative 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
Fiscal/revenue decentralization 0.32 0.10 −0.01 0.49
Cabinet size 6.28 1.12 5.00 9.00
Parliament size 115.32 47.00 46.00 200.00
Share of left-wingers in parliament 0.23 0.13 0.00 0.53
Growth income per capita 0.03 0.05 −0.26 0.42
Growth unemployment 0.17 0.59 −1.00 3.50
Growth population 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.05
Share of population below age 20 0.24 0.03 0.16 0.32
Share of population above age 64 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.21
Share of German speaking population 0.70 0.35 0.04 0.98
Postnumerando tax system 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
N = 566
The negative effect on the probability of realized deficits indicates that fiscal rules
have the intended effect and commit political actors on long-term fiscal sustainability.
Thus, our result adds to the existing literature showing that fiscal rules are effective.
However, we cannot rule out that, at least partly, budget deficits have been shifted to
off-budget deficits by fiscal gimmickry.
The differential effects of fiscal rules on projected and realized deficits are con-
sistent with the theoretical expectations discussed in Sect. 2. The effect on projected
deficits may be larger than the effect on realized deficits either because governments
use over-optimistic projections to buy time and meet rules requiring them to sub-
mit a balanced budget or because fiscal rules substitute for the strategic use of over-
pessimistic projections in budget negotiations by the finance minister. Since both
explanations point in the same direction, it is not possible to differentiate between
them. However, as can be seen in Table 1, deficit projections are on average much too
pessimistic in Swiss cantons over the sample period. While governments projected a
deficit in 75 % of all observed canton-years, only in 39 percent of the canton-years
a deficit actually materialized. Further, in column III of Table 3, we analyze the ef-
fects of fiscal rules on forecast accuracy. Our dependent variable (“forecast correct”)
is a dummy variable with value one if the sign of the budget balance, i.e., the sign
of revenues minus expenditures, was correctly anticipated and zero otherwise. In our
sample, the sign of the budget balance was correctly anticipated in 59 % of the ob-
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servations (see Table 1). According to our estimates, the introduction of fiscal rules
increases the probability that the occurrence of a deficit or surplus is correctly antici-
pated by 14 % (p-value: 0.0496). Using the natural log of the absolute forecast error
as a dependent variable, we find that fiscal rules reduce the forecast error by 30 %
(p-value: 0.048).7 Thus, despite the results being less statistically significant than the
results reported in columns I and II of Table 2, the evidence is consistent with fiscal
rules leading to projections which are more accurate on average. Together, we take
this as strong evidence that fiscal rules substitute for strategic projections in budget
negotiations.
One might be concerned about the endogeneity of the adoption of fiscal rules.
In particular, changes in fiscal conditions or political preferences may lead to the
adoption of fiscal rules and to smaller deficits. Let us carefully address this issue in
the following.
Endogeneity is clearly an important issue in estimating the effect of fiscal rules on
the probability of realized deficits (Poterba 1997). However, it is less clear why fiscal
conditions or preferences should influence the strategic use of forecasts. Thus, while
our OLS results on the effects on realized deficits have to be interpreted with caution,
the interpretation of the results on the differential effects on forecasted and realized
deficits is less plagued by endogeneity problems.
As pointed out by Poterba (1997), there are essentially two ways to address
the issue of endogenous fiscal institutions: Including some measure of voter pref-
erences or using instrumental variables. The previous literature either ignored the
issue or followed one of these approaches. Bohn and Inman (1996) and Feld and
Kirchgässner (2001) followed the first approach, Rueben (1995) and Debrun et
al. (2008) the second. As instruments for fiscal rules they used direct legislation
laws (Rueben 1995) and lagged fiscal rules and the commitment form of fiscal
governance (Debrun et al. 2008). However, direct legislation laws and the form
of fiscal governance influence fiscal outcomes through many channels other than
the enactment of fiscal rules (von Hagen and Harden 1995; von Hagen 1998;
Matsusaka 2005). (In fact, we include direct legislation laws as an additional con-
trol variable in our robustness analyses.) Lagging the explanatory variable does not
overcome the problem that permanent changes in preferences simultaneously affect
fiscal institutions and fiscal outcomes.
Despite our reservations regarding the validity of the exclusion restrictions, Ta-
ble 5 in the Appendix reports instrumental variable regressions with signature re-
quirements for popular initiatives and lagged fiscal rules as instruments. All Swiss
cantons have direct participation rights, but low signature requirements make it eas-
ier to adopt a fiscal rule even with identical fiscal conditions and political preferences.
The form of fiscal governance is very similar across cantons and stable over time, thus
we cannot use it as an instrumental variable. In addition, Table 5 reports regressions
with two additional instrumental variables capturing the share of neighboring cantons
that have adopted a fiscal rule. Once neighborhood is defined geographically, once it
is defined in terms of religion. In Switzerland, cantonal alliances based on religious
7Complete results available upon request from the authors.
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Table 2 Baseline regressions
I
Deficit
forecasted
II
Deficit
realized
II
Forecast
correct
Fiscal rule index −0.281a −0.153b 0.138b
(0.083) (0.065) (0.067)
[0.021] [0.062] [0.073]
{0.001} {0.019} {0.036}
Debt as share of cantonal income −0.272 0.081 0.221
(0.362) (0.438) (0.349)
Voter preferences 0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Growth income per capita 0.044 −0.180 −0.598
(0.632) (0.417) (0.808)
Growth unemployment 0.012 −0.054 −0.059
(0.058) (0.064) (0.071)
Growth population −6.911b −8.744b −4.148
(3.120) (3.702) (4.697)
Share of population below age 20 4.359 4.972 3.044
(3.733) (3.500) (3.189)
Share of population above age 64 3.405 6.166b 5.206
(3.642) (2.602) (5.417)
Share of German speaking population −0.001 −0.728 1.617
(1.318) (1.873) (2.180)
Postnumerando tax system 0.091 −0.237 −0.320c
(0.131) (0.163) (0.164)
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 566 566 566
Number of clusters 26 26 26
R-squared within 0.254 0.286 0.134
Notes: (1) Fixed effects OLS regressions; (2) standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at
the level of cantons; (3) p-values in brackets are estimated using the wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure to
account for the small number of clusters, p-values in braces account for nonnested two-way clustering at
the level of cantons and years;
ais significant at the 99 % level
bis significant at the 95 % level
cis significant at the 90 % level
ties are very important and the antagonism between Catholic and Protestant cantons
is an important aspect of Swiss history.
As can be seen from Table 5, the neighborhood variables and the signature require-
ment for popular initiatives are weak instruments and have counterintuitive signs in
the first-stage regressions. Further, the second stage results are very sensitive to the
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choice of instrument and the coefficients for fiscal rules range from negative to pos-
itive. With the share of religious neighbors with fiscal rules as an instrument, the
strongest of the three instruments at the first stage, we find results that are broadly
similar to the OLS regressions. The effect of fiscal rules on projected deficits is sta-
tistically significantly negative, the effect on realized deficits is negative but statisti-
cally insignificant and slightly larger (in absolute terms) than the effect on projected
deficits. Not surprisingly, the results with lagged fiscal rules are very similar to our
OLS estimates.
Given the concerns outlined above, the problems at the first stage, and the lack of
robustness of the second stage results, we prefer to rely on the alternative approach
of carefully controlling for fiscal conditions and fiscal preferences. In all regressions,
we include a measure of debt and of time-varying fiscal preferences at the cantonal
level as revealed in frequent federal ballots. This second measure, thus exploits the
unique institutional feature of regular direct democratic decisions on fiscal issues at
the federal level to capture fiscal preferences. Further, in the robustness analyses, we
include a rich set of additional political and institutional control variables.
Finally, we investigate if the adoption of cantonal fiscal rules is related to the main
language of the canton or the cantonal approval rate in the federal ballot on the debt
break at the federal level held in 2001. Language is a measure of culture; the approval
rate is probably the most direct measure for the relevant political preferences. As can
be seen from Table 6 in the Appendix, German speaking cantons are neither more
likely to adopt fiscal rules, nor to adopt them earlier. Similarly, there is no apparent
relationship between the approval rate to the federal debt break and the adoption date.
In the following, we assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in estimation
techniques, specifications and samples.
First, in all our regressions, we use a robust estimator of variance to allow for an
unspecified form of correlation between observations from the same canton in order
to account for serial correlation. With a small number of clusters, the cluster-robust
standard errors can be downward biased, leading to over-rejection of the null hy-
pothesis of no effect. In simulation studies with a setup similar to ours, the extent of
the over-rejection with cluster-robust standard errors and 20 clusters (i.e., less than
our 26 clusters) is small (5.8 % instead of 5 % in Bertrand et al. 2004) or nonexis-
tent (4.9 % instead of 5 % in Cameron et al. 2008). Nevertheless, we also use the
wild-cluster bootstrap-t procedure (using the ado-file provided by Malde 2012; with
100,000 draws), which has been found to do especially well by Cameron et al. (2008),
but which in their simulation study with a setup similar to ours and 20 clusters even
under-rejects the null (4.1 % versus 5 %). The respective p-values are reported in
brackets in Table 2. As can be seen from Table 2, all our results remain statistically
significant at least at the 10 % level. Clustering at the level of cantons accounts for
within-canton autocorrelated errors. As pointed out by Cameron et al. (2011), a simi-
lar issue may arise regarding the within-year cross-state errors, if there is geographic
based correlation. Therefore, we use their ado-file for estimating the variance with
nonnested multiway clustering and cluster at both the level of cantons and years. The
respective p-values are reported in braces in Table 2. With this variance estimator, all
our results in Table 2 remain significant at least at the 5 % level.
Second, since our dependent variables are binary, column I of Table 3 presents two
models based on fixed-effect logit regressions. As can be seen, the results are quali-
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tatively similar to the baseline regressions although the result for projected deficits is
marginally insignificant (p-value: 0.124) (bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors
with 100,000 draws). Third, creating a fiscal rule index necessarily involves subjec-
tive and, to some extent, arbitrary judgments regarding the stringency of different
provisions. For this reason, we replace in column II of Table 3 the fiscal rule index by
a dummy variable indicating whether or not a canton has a fiscal rule in a particular
year. Again, the results are quantitatively and qualitatively very similar to the baseline
regressions.
Fourth, in columns III to V, we add two sets of institutional and political control
variables. In column III, we add a dummy variable for mandatory fiscal referenda and
variables for signature requirements for initiatives and for revenue decentralization.
The latter variable is lagged one period in order to avoid mechanical correlations. In
column IV, we add variables for cabinet and parliament size and for the share of left-
wingers in the parliament. The latter variable is intended as an additional measure
of fiscal preferences of the electorate. In column V, both sets of control variables are
included jointly.
The size of the coefficients for fiscal rules decreases slightly in absolute terms if
these additional institutional and political controls are included. However, for both
dependent variables, the effects are still comfortably below zero. Among the addi-
tional institutional and political controls, only cabinet size has a significant effect on
the dependent variables. A larger cabinet is associated with a higher probability of
projected and realized deficits, although the latter effect is not significant in the most
complete model. The positive effect of cabinet size is consistent with the notion that
common pool externalities become more important if cabinet size increases (Schal-
tegger and Feld 2009).
Fifth, the results are robust to the exclusion of individual cantons. In the case
of projected deficits, estimates range from −0.333 (p-value: 0.000) if Solothurn in
excluded to −0.215 (p-value: 0.009) if Bern is excluded (see Table 7 for the full
results). In the case of realized deficits, estimates range from −0.173 (p-value: 0.026)
if Solothurn in excluded to −0.092 (p-value: 0.064) if Bern is excluded.
5 Concluding remarks
Our empirical analysis for Swiss cantons over the period 1984–2005 suggests that
fiscal rules have an economically and statistically significant negative effect on the
probability of a projected budget deficit. The effect on realized deficits is signifi-
cantly negative, too, but considerably smaller. Do fiscal rules improve the quality
of budget projections or rather increase creative accounting? In our empirical anal-
ysis, we provide evidence that deficit projections become more accurate with fiscal
rules. Together, we take this as evidence that fiscal rules substitute for strategic pes-
simism of finance ministers in budget negotiations with fellow cabinet members and
the legislature. In our context, therefore, fiscal rules not only have the intended con-
sequences on the fiscal outcome targeted by the rules but also the positive side effect
of more accurate deficit projections. Fiscal rules help, in this respect, to make the
budget process more transparent. Of course, we cannot rule out that some or all of
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the improvement in realized outcomes are due to creative accounting measures coun-
tervailing this positive effect of fiscal rules on transparency. Nevertheless, our results
highlight a hitherto disregarded effect of fiscal rules on transparency and contrast
with the common view that fiscal rules make the public budget less transparent. The
results have, thus, important implication for the evaluation of fiscal rules and other
budgetary institutions such as independent evaluation offices.
Our analysis suggests several avenues for future research. First, it would be im-
portant to see if our results carry over to another context. Second, it would be useful
to have a firm theoretical understanding and more direct evidence on the strategic
use of budget projections by finance ministers on the effect of fiscal rules. Finally, it
would be interesting to analyze the relative effect of different modes of fiscal gover-
nance, independent evaluation offices, and other fiscal institutions compared to and
in combination with fiscal rules on the accuracy of budget projections.
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Appendix
Table 4 Details of the relevant cantonal fiscal rules
AG Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 116 Constitution; Art. 2: 3 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Deficit to be compensated in the following budgets by 20 % p.a. (Art. 27: 1 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Consolidation program in case of violation of rule (Art. 2: 4 Fiscal law.)
Escape: (i) Severe recession: budget deficit to be compensated by 10 % p.a. (ii) Extraordinary
spending and revenues with qualified majority of parliament. (Art. 27: 2 27. 3; 27. 4(5) Fiscal
law.)
AR Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 96: 1 Constitution; Art. 9: 1 Fiscal law.)
Rule: No deficit above 5 % of projected tax revenues. Deficit to be compensated within 7
years. (Art. 9: 2 and 9: 3 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: No.
Escape: No.
BE Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 101: 1 Constitution; Art. 3: b, c Fiscal law.)
Rule: No deficit in the budget. No medium-term deficits for investments. (Art. 101a,b: 1, 2, 3
Constitution.)
Sanction: Realized deficits have to be compensated in 4 years. (Art. 101a: 2 Constitution.)
Escape: 3/5 of all members of parliament. (Art. 101a,b: 3, 4, 5 Constitution.)
FR Target: Balanced budget (Art. 83: 1 Constitution; Art. 5 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Net indebtedness to GDP not above 6.5 . Budget deficits have to be compensated
within 5 years. (Art. 5 and Art. 40b,d: 1 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Tax increases if budget deficit is above 2 % of total revenues. (Art. 41: 3 Fiscal law.)
Escape: Majority of members of parliament. (Art. 40c: 1 Fiscal law.)
GR Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 93: 2 Constitution.)
Rule: Budget deficit has to be compensated by at least 25 % p.a. (Art. 3: 4 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: No.
Escape: No.
JU Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 3: 1 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Self-financing of 89 % for public investments; of 100 % in case of budget deficit. (Art.
123a: 1, 2 Constitution.)
Sanction:
Escape: 2/3 majority of parliament. (Art. 123a: 3, 4 Constitution.)
LU Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 76: 2 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Budget deficit not above 4 % of total revenues. Budget deficit has to be compensated
within 4 years with 25 % p.a. (Art. 7: 1, 2 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: No.
Escape: In times of economic downturn, budget deficit has to be compensated within 8 years
with 12.5 % each year. (Art. 7 Fiscal law.)
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Table 4 (Continued)
NE Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 3: 2 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Budget deficit has to be compensated by 20 % p.a. in the following budgets if deficit is
above 2 % of total revenue. Self-financing of public investments not below 70 %. (Art. 3
Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Tax increase to compensate large projected budget deficit. If budget rule is violated
in two consecutive years, the maximum level of budget deficit is reduced to 1 % of total
revenue. (Art. 3 Fiscal law.)
Escape: 3/5 of all members of parliament for a maximum time span of 2 years. (Art. 57: 3, 4
Constitution.)
SG Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 82: 1 Constitution.)
Rule: Taxes are set in order that the projected budget deficit is not above 3 % of total tax
revenue. Budget deficit has to be compensated in the following years. Tax cuts only possible
if equity is above 20 % of total tax revenue (Art. 61: 1, 2; Art. 64: 1, 2 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Tax increases if budget rules is violated. (Art. 61: 1 Fiscal law.)
Escape:
SO Target: Balanced budget.
Rule: Budget deficit has to be compensated within 4 years. (Art. 23: 2 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Majority of members of parliament have to accept new spending items. (Art. 40: 1
Fiscal law.)
Escape: Majority of members of parliament. (Art. 23: 1 Fiscal law.)
SZ Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 4 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Expenditures above 10 Mio. CHF (non-recurring) or 2 Mio. CHF (recurring) have to
prove the financing. (Art. 42: 1 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Tax increases if expenditures exceed revenues. (Art. 42: 1, 2 Fiscal law.)
Escape: No.
VS Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 3: 1 Fiscal law.)
Rule: Budget deficit has to be compensated within 2 years. (Art. 25:1, 2, 3 Constitution.)
Sanction: No.
Escape: Majority of members of parliament in case of economic downturn, flood and other
extraordinary circumstances. In these cases, budget deficits have to be compensated in 5 years
with a possibility of prolongation of 2 years (Art. 4, Art. 5 Fiscal law.)
ZH Target: Balanced budget. (Art. 123: 1 Constitution.)
Rule: Budget deficit has to be compensated within 5 years. Qualified majority of large
expenditure programs (Art. 123: 2 Constitution; Art. 4: 3 and Art. 21 Fiscal law.)
Sanction: Consolidation program with spending cuts if medium-term plans indicate deficits.
(Art. 4: 2 Fiscal law.)
Escape: Majority of members of parliament. (Art. 21 Fiscal law.)
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Table 6 Cantons’ adoption date
of fiscal rules, main language
and approval rate in federal
ballot on fiscal rule
Notes: (1) The columns report
the year in which cantons
adopted their fiscal rule, the
main language of the canton,
and the approval rate of voters in
a federal ballot on the federal
fiscal rule on December 2, 2001.
D; G stands for German, F for
French, and I for Italian;
(2) The hypotheses that German
and French and Italian speaking
cantons were equally likely to
adopt fiscal rules cannot be
rejected (p-value: 0.410).
Spearman’s rank correlation
between adoption date and
language (G = 1, F and I = 0) is
statistically insignificant
(p-value: 0.770);
(3) Spearman’s rank correlation
between adoption date and
approval rate statistically
insignificant (p-value: 0.662).
Canton Cantonal rule
(adoption date)
Language Federal rule
(approval rate)
AG 2005 G 86.7
AI – G 89.2
AR 1996 G 87.8
BE 2002 G 86.0
BL – G 87.2
BS – G 84.8
FR 1960 F 86.1
GE – F 74.8
GL – G 86.5
GR 1988 G 86.0
JU 2001 F 75.1
LU 2001 G 88.7
NE 2005 F 80.3
NW – G 89.6
OW – G 87.6
SG 1929 G 89.3
SH – G 80.2
SO 1986 G 86.8
SZ 2004 G 87.0
TG – G 88.7
TI – I 74.7
UR – G 81.5
VD – F 82.6
VS 2005 F 78.3
ZG – G 88.8
ZH 2001 G 85.3
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Table 7 Exclusion of individual cantons
Canton Forecasted Canton Realized
Coef. Robust SE p-value Coef. Robust SE p-value
SO −0.333 0.072 0.000 SO −0.173 0.073 0.026
NW −0.301 0.084 0.001 NE −0.171 0.063 0.012
NE −0.296 0.084 0.002 JU −0.169 0.065 0.016
ZH −0.294 0.084 0.002 AG −0.162 0.070 0.029
JU −0.293 0.084 0.002 NW −0.161 0.067 0.024
OW −0.290 0.086 0.002 VS −0.161 0.067 0.025
SZ −0.287 0.082 0.002 OW −0.161 0.067 0.025
GL −0.287 0.084 0.002 SZ −0.160 0.062 0.016
TG −0.286 0.085 0.003 GR −0.160 0.069 0.029
GE −0.285 0.084 0.002 SH −0.160 0.065 0.022
SH −0.284 0.085 0.003 FR −0.158 0.068 0.030
SG −0.283 0.085 0.003 VD −0.157 0.065 0.023
GR −0.282 0.087 0.003 SG −0.156 0.065 0.024
VD −0.282 0.084 0.003 TG −0.155 0.068 0.032
ZG −0.281 0.084 0.003 GE −0.155 0.066 0.028
AG −0.280 0.089 0.004 ZG −0.153 0.066 0.028
TI −0.279 0.085 0.003 ZH −0.153 0.067 0.032
VS −0.276 0.088 0.004 AI −0.152 0.066 0.031
BS −0.275 0.083 0.003 BL −0.151 0.063 0.026
FR −0.272 0.083 0.003 TI −0.148 0.065 0.033
AI −0.272 0.084 0.003 AR −0.147 0.071 0.049
BL −0.271 0.084 0.004 BS −0.146 0.065 0.035
UR −0.265 0.078 0.003 LU −0.144 0.083 0.094
AR −0.264 0.088 0.006 GL −0.141 0.063 0.035
LU −0.260 0.106 0.022 UR −0.133 0.061 0.038
BE −0.215 0.075 0.009 BE −0.092 0.048 0.064
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